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SECURITIES LAW: A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
DENNIS B. O'BOYLE*
JOAN J. FITZPATRICK**
During the 1978-79 term, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit decided a number of cases involving securities and
commodities law.' Some may have significant future impact. In gen-
eral, however, the more "traditional" types of cases, 2 such as standing
and the sale of securities, were decided in line with established prece-
dent. Only one 1978-79 securities case deviated from precedent. 3 In
that case, the Seventh Circuit sought to restrict private litigation in an
area in which such a right has been allowed by other circuits for a
number of years. 4 However, in this case, as in most of the securities
cases decided this term, the Seventh Circuit followed the lead of the
United States Supreme Court by not extending any private rights of
action.5
FRAUD IN A WILLIAMS ACT TENDER OFFER
Since the late 1960's, the decided trend in American corporate life
has been toward combining or affiliating with other corporations. Such
business combinations may be effected through a variety of methods
which include merger, consolidation, purchase of assets or tender of-
fer.6 The use of tender offers has become increasingly popular and be-
cause of the potential for abuse, especially from the shareholders' point
* Special Counsel, Regulation for the Chicago Regional Office of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. B.S.. J.D., Drake University.
** Attorney, Branch of Enforcement for the Chicago Regional Office of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. B.A., University of Illinois, J.D. Loyola University School of Law.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for
any private publication of any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the authors' colleagues
upon the staff of the Commission.
I. O'Brien v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979):
Nemkov v. O'Hare Chicago Corp., 592 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1979): Hunt v. Commodities Future
Trading Comm'n, 591 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1979): Bastian v. Lakefront Realty Corp., 581 F.2d 685
(7th Cir. 1978); Capos v. Mid-America Nat'l Bank, 581 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1978). Indiana Nat'l
Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 578 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1978).
2. See O'Brien v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979):
Nemkov v. O'Hare Chicago Corp., 592 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1979).
3. Capos v. Mid-America Nat'l Bank, 581 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1978).
4. See Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956): Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank.
290 F. Supp. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904
(1970): Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949).
5. See Bastian v. Lakefront Realty Corp.. 581 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1978).
6. A tender offer is not defined either in the Williams Act or in the rules under the Securities
and Exchange Act. However, several courts have attempted to define the term. See Cattleman's
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of view, Congress amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by
the addition of sections 13(d), 7 13(e), 8 14(d), 9 14(e) ° and 14(f).1 These
sections are commonly called "The Williams Act" after their sponsor,
Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey. The Williams Act is
designed to protect the shareholder of the target corporation whose
stock is sought to be acquired by the bidder corporation.'
2
As with the Securities Act of 1933,13 the primary emphasis of the
Williams Act is disclosure to the investor. 14 The Williams Act requires
that any cash tender offer for securities of an issuer, registered pursuant
to section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 shall be filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission' 6 prior to, or contemporane-
ous with, its public announcement.' 7 Certain basic disclosures must be
provided to the target company's shareholders so that they can be in a
position to make informed, intelligent decisions as to the tender of their
shares. '
8
Notice to the shareholders of the existence of the tender offer and
Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251-52 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc.,
[19731 91 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455.
On November 29, 1979, in Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6159, the Commission pro-
posed an amendment to rule 14d-l(b)(l), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-l(b)(l), which would define the
term "tender offer." As proposed, the term would include one or more offers to purchase which
(I) during any forty-five day period are directed to more than ten persons and seek over five
percent of the class of securities, with the exception of certain limited purchases through a bro-
ker/dealer at the current market price or (2) which are not otherwise tender offers under the
proposed rule but which are disseminated in a widespread manner, provide for a premium in
excess of the greater of five percent of or $2 above the current market price and do not provide for
a meaningful opportunity to negotiate price and terms. For an excellent article on the subject, see
Einhorn & Blackburn, The Deeloping Concept of Tender Offer.- An Analysis of the Judicial d
Administrative Interpretations, 20 CORP. PRAC. COM. 281 (1978).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
8. Id. § 78m(e).
9. Id. § 78n(d).
10. Id. § 78n(e).
11. Id. § 78n(f).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3013.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
14. This is consistent with the intent of both the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976),
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 781(1976).
16. Hereinafter referred to as the SEC.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 781(1976).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-I (1979). Schedule 14d-I under the Securities and Exchange Act
requires the following information: the name of the security and the target company; the identity
and background of the bidder; past contracts, transactions or negotiations between the bidder and
the target; the source and amount of funds or other consideration which finance the purchase and
the bidder's plans concerning the target; the securities ownership of the target by the bidder; any
contracts, understandings or relationships between the bidder and the target; the identity of per-
sons used by the bidder to make solicitations; financial statements of the bidder in certain cases;
and other material information that is necessary for the shareholder to make his decision. Id.
SECURITIES
its terms and conditions is the heart of the Williams Act. In Indiana
National Bank v. Mobil Oil Co.,' 9 the Seventh Circuit decided that no-
tice of the termination of a tender offer was adequate when given in a
press release.
On August 13, 1974, Mobil Oil Company20 made a cash tender
offer to the shareholders of Marcor, Inc. to purchase 17,250,000
shares. 2' Like most tender offerors, Mobil permitted different methods
of tendering shares. The first method was by actual delivery of the
share certificates to the depositary or to one of its forwarding agents. A
second method was not available to all shareholders, but only to "eligi-
ble institutions" which included commercial banks and trust compa-
nies, members of national securities exchanges and members of the
National Association of Securities Dealers. These eligible institutions,
or shareholders tendering through them, did not have to immediately
deposit their stock certificates. All that was required was that the de-
positary or forwarding agent receive a properly executed letter of trans-
mittal and a guarantee of delivery. However, the shares had to be
actually deposited within eight days after Mobil's public announce-
ment of the termination of Mobil's offer.
The plaintiff banks, as eligible institutions, forwarded properly ex-
ecuted delivery guarantees to the depositary. Then, on August 26,
1974, Mobil transmitted a press release to all the wire services, trade
journals, newspapers, radio and television announcing the close of its
offer. However, plaintiffs did not deposit their Mobil shares within the
eight-day period after the press release regarding termination of the
offer. Therefore, Mobil declined to purchase any of the shares.
Plaintiffs' complaint contained allegations that Mobil failed to
make a required public announcement and made fraudulent omissions
regarding how the public announcement would be made.22 The plain-
tiffs also contended that they were entitled to sell the subject shares to
Mobil based on the plaintiffs' completion of the first phase of the
delayed delivery option.
The Seventh Circuit in Indiana National Bank held that the plain-
tiffs had not met the terms of Mobil's tender offer because of their fail-
ure to deposit the securities within eight days of the announcement.
19. 578 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1978).
20. Hereinafter referred to as Mobil.
21. As required by section 14(d)(6) of the Williams Act, Mobil agreed to accept, pro rata, all
shares tendered if the total exceeded 17,250,000. In fact, over 33,000,000 shares were ultimately
tendered. Id. at 182.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
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Therefore, according to the court, the plaintiffs were not entitled to pro-
rata sales to Mobil. 23 The Seventh Circuit also found that Mobil made
a satisfactory public announcement on August 26, 1974, by transmit-
ting a press release to the wire services and other news media.24 The
court said that the term "public announcement" has a generally under-
stood meaning and is satisfied by the issuance of a properly dissemi-
nated press release. The court noted that proposed rule 14e-2 25 would
require any extension of a tender offer to have been disclosed first by a
press release or other public announcement. 26 The court concluded
that there was no right to individual or personal notice simply because
the plaintiffs had complied with the first part of the tender offer's terms,
and further reminded the plaintiffs that they were sophisticated profes-
sionals to whom such a press release was reasonable notice.
In Indiana National Bank, the Seventh Circuit paid close attention
to the views of the Supreme Court as expressed in Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. 27 The Seventh Circuit chose not to expand available
causes of action under the Williams Act, especially when such an ex-
pansion would have required the court to stretch the definition of a
"public announcement" beyond the industry's accepted meaning and
practice.
PRIVATE ACTIONS FOR FAILURE To REGISTER UNDER THE
EXCHANGE ACT
Under section 12(g) of the Securities and Exchange Act,28 when an
issuer attains the status of $1 million in assets and concurrently has
over 500 holders of a class of equity securities, the issuer is automati-
cally required to register that class of equity security with the SEC,
29
file periodic reports, 30 comply with the proxy rules,31 and abide by
23. 578 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1978).
24. Id. at 185-87.
25. See 16 Sec. Docket 973 (Feb. 20, 1979).
26. The court also quoted from the New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, which
provides that "(t)he normal method of publication of important corporate data is by means of a
press release." 578 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir. 1978).
27. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). In Piper, the Supreme Court held
that a bidder in a tender offer does not have standing to sue under section 14(e). The Court stated
that the congressionial intent of section 14(e) was to protect the shareholders of the target com-
pany and bidders, as the regulated class under the statute, were not intended to be protected by the
legislation. Id. at 44-48.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78/(g) (1976).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 78(m). The periodic reports include an annual report on form 10-K, a quarterly
report on form 10-Q and a current report on form 8-K.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), 78n(b), 78n(c) (1976). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1979).
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other substantive provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act.32 The
case of Bastian v. Lakefront Realty Corp. 33 involved questions concern-
ing when an issuer's requirement to register under section 12(g) begins
and what, if any, liability is incurred by an issuer's failure to register.
The plaintiff in Bastian, a member of the Lake Shore Club of Chi-
cago 34 sued Lakefront Realty35 and the club on behalf of all Lakefront
stockholders to enjoin a proposed sale of the club's building and prop-
erty. All members were stockholders of Lakefront because they were
required to purchase Lakefront stock in order to join the club.
Lakefront had been organized by the club to hold, maintain and lease
to the club the land and structure which served as the club's clubhouse.
After negotiations between Lakefront and the club to renew the club's
lease were unsuccessful, Lakefront negotiated the sale of the property
to Northwestern University. 36 In March, 1977, after the negotiations
had failed, Lakefront sent its shareholders a letter from its directors
concerning the proposed sale which contained a notice of a meeting to
vote on the sale of the property and a proxy. Two-thirds of the votes
cast were in favor of the sale and the motion passed. The plaintiff,
alleging seven causes of action, sued to enjoin the sale. Count I alleged
violation of the federal proxy rules; count II alleged failure to register
pursuant to section 12 (g) of the Securities and Exchange Act; counts
III and IV alleged failure to file reports on corporate finances and in-
sider stockholdings; and counts V through VII invoked pendent state
law claims.
Concerning the allegations in count II regarding Lakefront's fail-
ure to register, the facts in Bastian were as follows. Prior to October,
1968, the defendant had at one time over 500 shareholders, but at the
time of the proxy solicitation had less than 300 shareholders. The de-
fendant had never registered pursuant to section 12(g) and therefore
had also never deregistered.
37
Plaintiffs requested relief was denied by the lower court. 38 The
32. When an issuer becomes a reporting company, officers, directors and 10% shareholders of
the reporting company are required to file reports of stock ownership in the reporting company
and may be held liable for any profits made in transactions of the reporting company's stock that
have occurred within a six month period. Five percent shareholders are required to file ownership
reports. Tender offers for the stock of a reporting company must comply with the provisions of
the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d), 78n(e), 78n(f) (1976).
33. 581 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1978).
34. Hereinafter referred to as the club.
35. Hereinafter referred to as Lakefront.
36. 581 F.2d at 688.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 78/ (g)(4) (1976).
38. See 581 F.2d at 689.
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plaintiff was also unsucessful at the appelate court level with the argu-
ment that since defendant at one time was required to have registered
with the SEC it should have done so, even if it could have deregistered
upon attaining less than 300 shareholders. 39 The court noted that the
SEC has no discretion to deny deregistration if the shareholder condi-
tion is met and that the issuer is automatically relieved of its Securities
and Exchange Act obligations within ninety days of the filing of its
application to deregister.
40
The court in Bastian did not address itself to the alleged lack of
registration, but stated that even if Lakefront should have registered, a
finding that the proxy provisions still applied to Lakefront due to
Lakefront's lack of deregistration would be to require "an idle and use-
less act."'4 ' According to the Seventh Circuit, the Securities and Ex-
change Act contains no provisions indicating a congressional intent to
abrogate the usual rule that the law does not require an unnecessary
act.42 Since there was no liability for failure to register, the proxy rules
had no application and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court
as to count 1.43 The Seventh Circuit further affirmed the district court
with regard to the remaining counts on the basis that the plaintiff had
not shown any likelihood of success on the merits and had failed to
show irreparable injury to the plaintiffs.44
It is useful to compare the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Bastian to
Kerber v. Kakos,45 a federal district court case involving a motion to
dismiss which was decided several years ago by Judge Prentice Mar-
shall. In Kerber, the court held that section 12(g) contained an implied
right of action in the public even though there is no express provision
in the statute itself.46 Judge Marshall noted that Congress enacted sec-
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 690. The court short-changed the plaintiff when it held that registration and com-
pliance with the proxy rules would be useless acts. The "useless act" would have provided a full
measure of disclosure to the plaintiff at the time of the proxy solicitation by Lakefront. If
Lakefront decided thereafter that it wished to deregister, the desire could be easily effected.
The whole premise of the federal securities laws is disclosure. When a doubt exists as to
whether disclosure should be mandated in a certain case, the decision should be made in favor of
disclosure. The innocent plaintiff should not be penalized for the violation of the defendant, over
which the plaintiff had no control.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 692.
44. Id. The sale to Northwestern University was on terms more favorable than those which
had been rejected by the club.
45. 383 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. IUI. 1974).
46. In Kerber, Judge Marshall relied heavily on Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Kardon court held that, with regard to a private suit for violation
of rule I Ob-5 under the Securities and Exchange Act, such a right of action was implied in order to
SECURITIES
tion 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act so that security holders of
non-exchange listed companies would have the same information dis-
closed to them as their counterparts listed on the exchange.47 In Ker-
ber, the court emphasized that a "threshold violation of section 12 may
well strip an investor of many of the protections Congress intended that
he have."
'4 8
The Seventh Circuit in Bastian did not mention Kerber or delve
into the legislative history of section 12. The Bastian decision is, to
some extent, contrary to the congressional intent behind section 12 of
providing disclosure to security holders of non-exchange listed compa-
nies.4
9
The Seventh Circuit emphasized that it would be a useless act to
require deregistration of Lakefront since that company had fewer than
300 shareholders for several years. Nevertheless, the company was al-
lowed to consider itself a non-reporting company without any action on
its part or notice to its security holders. Thus, Bastian countenances a
"mild" violation of the securities laws. It is hoped that Bastian will not
be used again to justify violations on the basis of "no harm, no foul."
' 50
SUIT UNDER THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING ACT
The SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 5'
each have three avenues of approach to redress violations of the laws
each enforces.5 2 These avenues include a civil suit brought by the
agency in federal district court, 53 an administrative proceeding brought
before the agency's administrative law judge,54 and recommendation
for criminal indictment to the Department of Justice.
55
further congressional intent in enacting the statute. See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess, reorinted in, [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3013.
48. 383 F. Supp. 625, 629 (N.D. I11. 1974).
49. See 31 VAND L. REV. 1513 (1978).
50. The company in Bastian was not a reporting company. If the company had been such a
reporting company, one wonders if the court would have been so liberal in interpreting the dere-
gistration provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act. Bastian would have considerable prece-
dential value in a case where a reporting company had less than 300 shareholders but had not
deregistered. In the latter case, the company ought not to be relieved of its reporting and proxy
requirements as there is a justifiable expectation on the part of the shareholders that the company
will be providing current, material information. Unfortunately, one can only speculate until a
case with those facts is heard by the court.
51. Hereinafter referred to as the CFTC.
52. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 9, 13a (1976).




In Hunt v. Commodity Futures Trading Commision,56 the CFTC
instituted an administrative proceeding under section 6(b) of the Com-
modity Exchange Act 57 at the same time that it brought an action in
federal district court for an injunction and other ancillary relief.58 The
members of the Hunt family sued to enjoin the CFTC from bringing an
administrative proceeding at the same time that the CFTC was also
seeking injunctive relief. The Hunts' position was that since the CFTC
chose to sue in district court, the CFTC was barred from instituting
administrative proceedings. The Hunts further contended that the
CFTC violated its own discovery rules 59 by adopting the evidentiary
record developed in the district court for use in the administrative pro-
ceedings. These arguments were not persuasive to the district court
which denied issuing either a temporary restraining order or a prelimi-
nary injunction. 60 The Hunts appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit disposed of the Hunts' administrative reme-
dies under the Administrative Procedure Act. 6' Referring to a long line
of cases, 62 the court stated that it is a "long settled rule of judicial ad-
ministration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been
exhausted."'63 The Seventh Circuit noted that under certain exemp-
tions to the exhaustion doctrine, a court may interrupt administrative
proceedings.64 The court determined, however, that no such exemp-
tions existed in Hunt. The Seventh Circuit found that there was noth-
ing in the Commodity Exchange Act or its legislative history which
indicated that the CFTC was required to make an election of reme-
dies. 65 Judge Markey of the United States Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals, sitting by designation in Hunt, registered a strong
dissent.66 In the dissent, Judge Markey stated that the CFTC should be
precluded from bringing any administrative proceedings until the ter-
mination of the civil action in accordance with the policy of the avoid-
56. 591 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1979).
57. Id. at 1236.
58. The CFTC also sought disgorgement of profits.
59. 591 F.2d at 1236. See also 17 C.F.R. § 10.42(b) (1977).
60. 591 F.2d at 1236.
61. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-76 (1976).
62. See Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258, 1259 (7th Cir. 1978); Squillacote v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1977); Grutka v. Barboor, 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977); Frey v. Commodity Exch. Auth., 547 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1976).
63. 591 F.2d at 1236, quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
64. 591 F.2d at 1235.
65. Id. at 1236-37. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in,
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2087.
66. 591 F.2d at 1237-43.
370
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ance of multiple litigation.67
It is not unusual for an agency's investigation to lead to both a
civil injunctive suit and an administrative proceeding. Facts uncovered
in an investigation can be material to issues in a civil injunction action
and an administrative proceeding. It is also not unusual for both types
of enforcement actions to be brought at or about the same time. The
civil injunctive actions are filed to stop prohibited, violative conduct
with the possibility of criminal contempt for further violations. Ad-
ministrative actions are filed in furtherance of an agency's obligation to
police the industry it licenses. Possible sanctions resulting from an ad-
ministrative proceeding brought by the CFTC or SEC range from a
censure of conduct or the revocation of the license of a registered en-
tity, to the prohibition from further practice in the area of commodities
or securities transactions. To rule that regulatory agencies would be
required to elect remedies would be to unduly restrict them. The avail-
ability of various remedies provides more flexibility to regulatory agen-
cies. The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Hunt evidences the court's
recognition of the necessity of both administrative and judicial reme-
dies to agencies like the CFTC and SEC to regulate the market and
protect the public.
EXTENSION OF CREDIT AND REGULATION U
In order to protect the integrity of the securities markets, particu-
larly with regard to the extension of credit for the purpose of purchas-
ing securities, the Federal Reserve Board, at the request of Congress,
promulgated regulations T, 6 8 U 69 G, 70 and X. 7' Although these regula-
tions are Federal Reserve Bank rules and are interpreted by that body,
they are enforced by the SEC as a part of its oversight of the securities
industry. Regulation T deals with the extension of credit by a broker-
dealer to its customer,72 regulation U with credit given by a bank to a
customer for purposes of purchasing securities, 73 regulation G with
loans to investors by any other lender for the same purpose,74 and regu-
lation X deals with prohibiting the borrower from violating any of the
67. Id.
68. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-220.129 (1979).
69. Id. §§ 221.1-221.4.
70. Id. §§ 207.1-207.5.
71. Id. §§ 224.1-224.6.
72. Id. §§ 220.1-220.129.
73. Id. §§ 221.1-221.4.
74. Id. §§ 207.1-207.5.
37/
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Federal Reserve's Extension of Credit Rules.75 The first three regula-
tions are similar in their operation with regard to use of securities for
collateral. Unless the securities are eligible securities, 76 collateral other
than the securities to be purchased must be used to secure the loan.
The ineligible margined securities are considered to have no loan
value. Securities deemed eligible for credit are also not given 100%
value for collateral purposes but rather some lesser percentage.
77
Although not usually the subject of private litigation, the Seventh
Circuit last term had occasion to decide a credit-purchase securities
case, Capos v. Mid-America National Bank.78 In Capos, the Seventh
Circuit had the opportunity to decide whether an investor has a cause
of action against a lender who does not sell the investor's collateralized
stock when the market indicates a decline in the stock's value. In 1969,
Capos had a $145,000 loan outstanding with the Mid-America Na-
tional Bank secured by 6,000 shares of Metals Corporation stock which
was eligible for loan purposes under regulation U. At that time, there
was no problem with regulation U.
Capos then borrowed an additional $22,000 secured by 4,000 more
shares of Metals Corporation. The purpose of the second loan was
stated to be to purchase more Metals Corporation stock.79 The stock
began to decline in value from $60 per share in 1968 to $21 per share in
1969, and finally to $3.20 per share several years thereafter. The stock
was never sold by the bank since Capos and the bank negotiated and
implemented a principal repayment plan. It should be noted that
Capos was aware of the decreasing value of the Metals Corporation
stock.
Capos sued the bank alleging a violation of regulation U because
the bank loaned him $4,600 more than it should have. In addition to
the alleged regulation U violation, Capos also sued on a common law
theory that a bank, holding stock as collateral for a loan, not only has a
right but a duty to foreclose on the collateral if its value should approx-
imate the amount owed.
The Seventh Circuit expressed doubt as to whether a private cause
of action exists for violation of regulation U.80 This point, however,
was merely dicta in the decision since the court disposed of Capos on
75. Id. §§ 224.1-224.6.
76. The Federal Reserve Board maintains a list of eligible securities.
77. The Federal Reserve Board regularly reassesses this percentage. The Board will raise or
lower it in line with overall monetary policy.
78. 581 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1978).
79. The loan value at that time was 20% of the securing stock or $17,400. Id. at 678.
80. Id. at 678-79.
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the basis of the running of the statute of limitations and found no limi-
tations period specified in the Securities and Exchange Act for such
actions. The Seventh Circuit adopted the limitations period from Illi-
nois, the forum state which best effectuated the federal policy at issue.8'
Although Capos had argued for a five-year limitations period based
upon an Illinois statute dealing with actions for the recovery of damage
for injury to property,8 2 the Seventh Circuit disagreed and held that a
two-year limitation period set for actions for statutory penalties in Illi-
nois applied.8 3 The court could not find any injury to Capos by the
bank because of the violation of Regulation U. In fact, the Seventh
Circuit found that Capos received more money as a loan to him than
he ought otherwise to have received. The court stressed that regulation
U was meant to prohibit the loan by the bank; hence, the bank was the
party injured by the violation, not Capos.
Capos fared no better with his common law count. The Seventh
Circuit noted from the evidence admitted at the trial court that Capos
was at all times aware of the value of the Metals Corporation stock and
could have instructed the bank to sell the stock and liquidate the debt.
The court characterized the loss involved with the stock's diminution in
value as an investment loss, the occurrence of which was largely in the
hands of Capos and not the bank. Illinois common law, the court held,
does not impose any duty on a pledgee to liquidate collateral at a time
when it is depreciating in value. 84 In addition, section 9-207(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code provides, in pertinent part:
A secured party must use reasonable care in the custody and preser-
vation of collateral in possession.8 5
Although the Seventh Circuit found section 9-207(1) determina-
tive, the court further looked to section 18 of the Restatement of Secur-
ity 86 which provides that "[t]he pledgee is not liable for a decline in the
value of pledged instruments, even if timely action could have pre-
vented such decline." Thus, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment in favor of the bank.
It should be no surprise, however, that the court in Capos con-
cluded that no private cause of action exists for violation of regulation
U by the customer's trading bank. After the enactment of regulation X
by the Federal Reserve Board in 1970, courts changed their position
81. Id.
82. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1977).
83. Id.
84. 581 F.2d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 1978).
85. ILL. REV STAT.. ch. 26, § 9-207(1) (1977).
86. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 18 (1941).
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regarding the existence of a private right of action for violations of the
margin rules. 87 Since 1970, a growing body of case law has held that
no such private right of action exists. 88 The reason most often given to
justify this change is that by promulgating regulation X, the Federal
Reserve Board meant to place the responsibility for compliance with
the margin requirements on the customer as well as the broker.89 Since
both the customer and the broker are now required to comply with the
margin requirements, there is no basis for the continuing validity of the
rationale allowing a private right of action. One recent case held that
no private right of action exists to remedy a lender's violation of the
margin requirements, even if the violation antedated the passage of
regulation X.90 In Capos, the Seventh Circuit again followed the lead
of the Supreme Court in restricting private litigation involving the fed-
eral securities laws whenever possible.9'
DEFINITION OF A SALE
A voting trust is a means whereby owners of securities relinquish
some of their rights in the securities which they own, principally the
right to vote those securities. 92 The owner places his shares in a trust,
under the control of a trustee, along with other owners who do likewise.
The trustee then has the sole power to vote the shares, in accordance
with the terms of the trust.93 Each owner will receive new securities in
the form of voting trust certificates indicating his interest in the trust.
87. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German Inc., 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970); Junger v. Hertz,
Neumark & Warner Inc., 426 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1970); Livingston v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,
294 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), a/i'd, 409 F.2d 1360, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp.
453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Fisch v. Banks, 58 Misc. 2d 839, 296 N.Y.S. 2d 830 (1969); Meyer v. Schields
& Co., 267 N.Y.S. 2d, 25 A.2d 126 (1966).
88. Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S.
890 (1977); Establissement Tomis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Drasner v.
Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Freeman v. Marine Midland
Bank, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,902; Schy v. FDIC, [1977-78] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,242; Theoharous v. Bache & Co., [1977-78] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,281.
89. See cases in note 87 supra.
90. See, e.g., Utah State Univ. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert denied,
434 U.S. 890 (1977).
91. See Freeman v. Marine Midland Bank, [1979] FED. SEC, L. REP. (CCH) 96,902.
92. See Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); United Housing Found., Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores Inc., 421 U.S. 723
(1975).
93. See Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966); Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
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Such trusts typically last ten years but can be renewed after that time.94
In Nemkov v. O'Hare Chicago Corp. ,95 the plaintiffs owned shares
of stock in the defendant corporation. In 1969, defendant Karlos asked
the plaintiffs to participate in a voting trust. Pursuant to the trust,
plaintiffs delivered their shares to the defendant trustee, the La Salle
National Bank and received voting trust certificates. Plaintiffs did not
know at that time, and did not learn until 1971 that they had relin-
quished their voting rights for ten years. The plaintiffs filed their com-
plaint until 1971 and alleged violations of section 17(a)(2) 96 of the
Securities Act, section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 97 and
rule 10b-5. 98 The plaintiffs alleged fraud and asked to have the agree-
ment rescinded and their stock returned. The district court ruled that
the action was time barred; that the exchange of stock for voting trust
certificates did not constitute a purchase or sale for purposes of section
10(b) or rule lOb-5; and that the plaintiffs failed to allege "scienter" for
purposes of the section 17(a)(2) claim.99 Thus, the district court dis-
missed the complaint' ° for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.' 0 '
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court,'
10 2
but only on the basis of failure to institute a timely law suit. The court
held that since there are no statutes of limitation for sections 17(a)(2),
10(b) and rule lOb-5, the three-year Illinois statute of limitations 0 3 for
similar actions' ° was applicable. Plaintiffs' contention that the Illinois
statute of limitations was inapplicable because the plaintiff was seeking
equitable rather than legal relief was discussed but ultimately rejected
by the court. The Seventh Circuit stated that equitable jurisdiction is
concurrent with legal jurisdiction and thus concluded that if the action
at law was barred, so too was the equitable action.
10 5
Nemkov is perhaps more significant for what the Seventh Circuit
did not decide. The court did not address the issue of whether there
was a purchase when plaintiffs exchanged their securities. It passed
94. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965).
95. 592 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1979).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1976).
97. Id. § 78j(b).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
99. See, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters Ltd. 288 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
100. 592 F.2d at 353-4 n.2.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
102. 592 F. 2d at 356.
103. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.121 , § 137.13(D) (1977).
104. Id. This section pertains generally to securities violations.
105. 592 F.2d at 355-56.
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over this issue and found that plaintiffs' action was barred by the Illi-
nois statute of limitations.
Nemkov should have begun with the question of whether any
claim existed under the anti-fraud provisions and then proceeded to the
applicable statute of limitations for such a determination of whether a
purchase, sale, or gift had taken place should have been made since the
anti-fraud provisions apply only to purchases or sales, and not to gifts.
In Nemkov, there was an exchange of securities.
0 6
Exchanges have been held to be sales in the Seventh Circuit since
1946 o7 when the court found that an offer to exchange beneficial trust
certificates for limited partnership interests constituted a sale for pur-
poses of section 2(3) of the Securities Act of 1933.108 Other case law
has supported this proposition. 10 9
An offer to exchange securities involves a new investment decision
on the part of the exchanging party. This decision-making process dif-
ferentiates an exchange from a gift since in the latter there is no voli-
tion on the part of the recipient of the gift; the donee simply accepts
what is given without the requirement of having to give something in
return. Congress recognized an exchange to be a sale when it enacted
sections 3(a)(9)110 and 3(a)(10)" l of the Securities Act of 1933 which
are transaction exemptions from section 5 of the Act for certain ex-
changes. Logically, these exemptions would have been unnecessary
had all exchanges been thought not to be sales.
It is unfortunate that the Seventh Circuit chose to base its opinion
on the limitations question and completely bypass the issue of whether
a sale took place. The court should have first determined the sale ques-
tion. It is hoped that the Nemkov case will be cited only for the statute
of limitations holding and not for the implied holding that no sale took
place under section 2(3) of the Securities Act." 1
2
106. Id. at 353.
107. United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1946).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976).
109. SEC v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 937
(1974). No less eminent an authority than Professor Louis Loss also supports the conclusion that a
sale occurs when an exchange of securities takes place. According to Professor Loss, "lilt is clear
on the face of the statute [Section 2(3) of the Securities Act] that an exchange of one security for
another is a sale .... " I L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATIONS 513 (1961 ed.).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1976).
i11. Id. § 77c(a)(10).
112. Id. § 77b(3).
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STANDING TO SUE: PURCHASER OR SELLER OF SECURITIES
Securities ownership in the United States today is increasingly in-
direct ownership through pension funds, mutual funds or the like,
rather than direct ownership by the individual investor. This indirect
ownership may even take on a second level, as where fund managers
turn over fund assets to an outside party, such as a bank, for invest-
ment. In O'Brien v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.,
1 1 3
the trustees of nine separate pension trust funds entered into agree-
ments with CINB so that the latter would have sole responsibility and
discretion in the investment of the various trust funds' assets. Acting
pursuant to these agreements, CINB bought and sold stock of a
number of companies of which CINB was also a substantial creditor.
The plaintiffs in O'Brien alleged that in some instances CINB re-
ceived information as a creditor that was not available to the public
and, at other times, CINB's role as creditor enabled it to affect dividend
policies of the companies whose securities CINB was purchasing for
the plaintiffs. Since these "conflicts of interest" were not disclosed to
the plaintiffs, they sued CINB for violating section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act" 4 and rule lOb-5,11 5 and included pendent state
claims based upon breaches of fiduciary duty and contract.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' cases on the basis that
they had no standing to sue under section 10 (b) and rule lOb-5 and
found that plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities."1
6
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that the plaintiffs
were not the purchasers of the securities bought in their behalf as bene-
ficiaries of the trust by the trustee CINB. The court further stated that
the purchaser in O'Brien was the CINB and that the section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 protected the CINB, not the plaintiffs. The holding was
based upon the plaintiffs having given up all investment decisions to
the bank. The court cited Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 117 and Blue
Chip Stamps, Inc. v. Manor Drug Stores, Inc. I" as precedent. In both
cases, the plaaintiffs were denied standing on the ground that they had
neither purchased nor sold securities.
In Birnbaum, the plaintiff derivatively sued an officer and director
113. 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979). Continental Illinois National Bank is hereafter referred to
CINB.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
116. 593 F.2d at 56-57. See 431 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
117. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
118. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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of Newport Steel Corporation for violations of section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933. The officer had sold his Newport shares, which
amounted to sale of the controlling interest, to another corporation for
twice the market value of the shares. Birnbaum had neither bought nor
sold securities during or after the officer's sale of the stock. He sued
only as a stockholder. The Second Circuit denied Birnbaum standing
under 10(b) and stated that section 10(b) was directed at the same type
of misrepresentation usually associated with the purchase or sale of se-
curities and not at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs."' 9
Blue Chp Stamps involved an offeree who also sued on the basis
of section 10(b). In Blue Chp Stamps, an offer of shares had been
made because of an order to divest pursuant to antitrust litigation. The
defendants had sent out prospectuses to certain offerees per that order.
The plaintiff, an offeree, alleged that he had suffered a loss because he
had not purchased stock pursuant to the offering due to the fact that the
prospectus was overly pessimistic and therefore materially misleading.
The Court denied the plaintiff standing under section 10(b) because he
was neither a purchaser nor a seller. The Court then stated its twofold
rational for the limitation of standing under section 10(b). First, the
Court intended to limit meritless litigation brought for settlement value
only. Second, the Court believed that the proof of injury or the amount
of injury for a nonpurchaser or nonseller was a best proof of hazy his-
torical facts. 1
20
When the Seventh Circuit in O'Brien denied standing, the court
cited Blue Chp Stamps. However, contrary to the facts of Blue Chp
Stamps, in O'Brien there were purchases ofsecurities and ascertainable
damages. Thus, it appears that the Seventh Circuit based its decision to
limit standing in O'Brien upon the Supreme Court's first rationale in
Blue Chp Stamps of limiting all section 10(b) litigation. The court did
so by defining purchaser as the party who makes the investment deci-
sion and not as the party on whose behalf the investment decision is
made. The court stated:
[W]e are unable to say categorically that plaintiffs, on whose behalf
[CINB] bought, were not in any sense purchasers of the securities.
Nevertheless, we believe that considerations that helped to shape the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green
• ..and Blue Chip as well, require the same result here, and that
therefore a cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is not
to be implied in the circumstances of this case.121
119. 93 F.2d at 464.
120. 421 U.S. at 743.
121. 593 F.2d at 66.
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The court found that CINB rather than the plaintiffs made the decision
and, therefore, were the protected parties under the rule.
The only power that the plaintiffs' retained over the defendant was
the power to terminate the agreements with CINB at will, and plaintiffs
did so terminate eventually. The plaintiffs in O'Brien alleged that they
were induced not to exercise their powers of termination and that if
they had known all the facts concerning CINB's relationshp with the
companies whose securities were being purchased, they would have
made different trades. However, important facts material to the deci-
sion whether to terminate the trust agreements with CINB were consid-
ered by the court to be outside the penumbra of section 10(b), as
defined by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green,'
22
because the termination of the agreement was not a securities transac-
tion. In addition, the Seventh Circuit in O'Brien reasoned that if the
plaintiffs' contentions were upheld, then the court would be superim-
posing upon state fiduciary law a requirement that a trustee inform
beneficiaries of the trust prior to the trustee's investment decision, a
decision solely within the discretion of the trustee. This the O'Brien
court declined to do.
Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
with regard to the federal securities laws' claims, the court reversed as
to the pendent state claims.' 23 The district court decision in O'Brien
was based on the reasoning that the issues involved in the plaintiffs'
case were moot and should be decided by the Illinois state courts.
124
The Seventh Circuit, however, found that such was not the case since
the statute of limitations under Illinois law was running throughout the
pendency of the federal district court litigation, which began in 1972. 125
The Seventh Circuit felt that it was an abuse of discretion also to dis-
miss the pendent state claims when plaintiffs would be subject to a mo-
tion to dismiss, likely to be granted, if the plaintiffs filed in state
court. 126
In light of the holding in Blue Chp Stamp, the decision in O'Brien
is clearly correct. It is interesting to note that but for Blue Chip Stamps,
the Seventh Circuit would likely have decided O'Brien differently.
Two years prior to Blue Chip Stamps, the Seventh Circuit decided Ea-
122. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
123. 593 F.2d at 66.
124. Id. at 64.
125. The case had been reassigned to three separate judges during this time. Judgments were
not entered until late in 1977. Id.
126. Id. at 64-65.
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son v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 127 and abolished the Birnbaum
limitation on standing. 128 At the time Eason was decided, the court
was not concerned that the holding would open flood gates to multitu-
dinous and frivolous claims, thereby inundating an already over-
worked federal courts system. In Eason, the Seventh Circuit preferred
to define the appropriate limits of relief on a case-by-case basis using
causal-nexus analysis. 129 Since the Blue Chip Stamp decision, however,
courts throughout the country have become more conservative and
have denied standing to sue in most cases. 1
30
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit during 1978-79 was not presented with cases
involving unusual or novel questions of securities law. Rather, the se-
curities cases were of a traditional type and the Seventh Circuit used a
conservative approach in deciding the cases. Much attention has been
given to the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in which the Court
has quite clearly expressed an attitude disfavoring the expansion of ju-
dicial remedies. The Seventh Circuit appears mindful of the fact that
several of its decisions which have gone to the Supreme Court are now
major decisions in the area of federal securities law. If the decisions of
the Seventh Circuit during 1978-79 are indicative of the way that the
court will hold in the future, then we will see little in the way of expan-
sion in the area of federal securities law.
127. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973).
128. Prior to Eason, the Seventh Circuit appears to have followed the Birnbaum rule. See
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma., Bard v. Dasho, 389
U.S. 977 (1967).
129. For further discussion of the implications of Blue Chop Stamp on opinions decided by the
Seventh Circuit, See 7 LoY-CHl. L. REv. 484 (1976).
130. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); H.S.
Equities, Inc. v. Fleet, 420 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Ruskary v. Levin, [1976-77] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,842.
